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THE GENTLEMAN IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS*
THOMAS L. SHAFFER**
"This is awful. Miss Manners sees great progress in the fact that many occupations
are now open to ladies and gentlemen, not just the traditional ones of exploiting
serfs and marrying money, but is dismayed that they have forgotten how to act like
ladies and gentlemen."
-Judith Martin1
"Only when he has linked these parts together in well-tempered harmony and has
made himself one man instead of many, will he be ready to go about whatever he
may have to do ..
-Plato, The Republic
2
On December 7, 1983, the forty-second anniversary of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Dr. Mark Craig, of St. Eligius's
Hospital in Boston, declined an illicit proposal put to him by his
colleague, Dr. Kathy Martin. He did so with evidence of effort -
referring, for example, to the younger doctor as "that whacko from
pathology" - but he acted decisively, and Dr. Martin returned to her
laboratory in the morgue. Dr. Craig acted with personal and pro-
fessional clarity; his moral argument to Dr. Martin was based on
professionalism. But he also reported the proposal to Mrs. Craig, who
visited Dr. Martin's laboratory and persuaded Dr. Martin that pro-
miscuous freedom with younger doctors was better for her than life
with Dr. Craig would have been.
Dr. Martin's laboratory has often seen the failure of virtue in lesser
physicians than Dr. Craig. (It is apparently the case that medical
training helps a person overcome difficulties a lay person might
expect to have in a love nest shared by cadavers and formaldehyde.)
But I mean here to notice something more general than occasional
instances of virtue in Boston. The significance of this story is that it is
important to Dr. Craig to be a gentleman. Dr. Craig practices medi-
* Part of this essay was given as the Willis G. Cunningham Memorial Lecture in
Law and Medicine at Queen's University, February 9,1984; part of it was given as
the Charles N. Burch Lecture at Vanderbilt University, April 5, 1984.
** B.A., J.D., LL.D.; Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; member of
the Indiana Bar.
1 "Miss Manners," The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1984, at K-1, col. 6, K-5, col. 1; see
note 54 infra.
2 As translated by Edmund Pincoffs, "Quandary Ethics," in Stanley Hauerwas and
Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), Revisions 92 (1983).
2 Queen's Law Journal
cine, and Mrs. Craig lives a traditional, married-woman's life, with
competence, clarity, compassion, and prosperity. Their behavior is in
steady contrast to the behavior of the resident physicians at St.
Eligius and their partners. The residents are also competent and
compassinate, but they tend to casual sex in the basement, to the
abuse of controlled drugs, and to unseemly rebellion against the
establishment. They swear; they break the furniture when they are
angry; Dr. Craig says that what they do "smacks of the unethical."
What he means is that these young doctors should be gentlemen, and
if they cannot be gentlemen they should get out of his profession.
Dr. Craig's position teems with moral difficulties, of course. He is
often arrogant and always opinionated. His professional relations
with his juniors show the residue of exploitation of the serfs. His
inherited racism and sexism bend only to demonstrations of profes-
sional competence: He respects black people and women when they
are good physicians. As the episode with Dr. Martin demonstrates,
the women in his life are often temptresses. His view of medicine as a
profession is patriarchical: Medicine, to him, is appropriately domi-
nated by older, white males. The remarkable fact is that those who
design, write, and prepare a popular, commercial television program
fix at its moral centre three old-fashioned gentlemen, the most arrest-
ing of whom is Dr. Craig. That fact says something about them, and
something about those of us who watch the program. It says that
modern professional ethics, may not, after all, rest on codes and
canons and Kant.
The residents at St. Eligius regard Dr. Craig as a model physician
- in his medicine, in his use of power, and in his personal life. They
are not old-fashioned enough to say that he is a gentleman, but it is
possible to claim that he is a model because he is a gentleman.3 His
presence is an ethical argument; the ethical argument is that the
morals of the gentleman are appropriate to professional ethics. Dr.
Craig is in this respect the medical analogue of Lawrence Preston,
3 The word has not disappeared from contemporary ethical usage, even among
writers that are understood to be modern and unromantic: Tom Shale!., "William
Powell: The Actor as Gentleman," The Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1984, p. C-i, col.
1, spoke of the late Mr. Powell as having dignity, grace, and panache; Mr. Shales
used the adjectives nice, charming, elegant, understated, civilized, nostalgic
without being sentimental, witty, agile, classy, and dashing. He said Mr. Powell
was not given to airs or illusions. Many of these words suggest manners and style,
but others - and the point of the essay - have to do with moral excellence.
Newspaper writers spoke of the late political reporter, Carroll Kilpatrick, as
gentle, friendly, loyal, fair, balanced, tough-minded, modest, reliable, unruffled,
quiet, attentive, deeply and personally respectful, and good. They said he was a
Southern gentleman and - as these words indicate - mingled descriptions of
professional competence with descriptions of admirable morals. Obituary by
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lawyer-gentleman of the 1960s television series "The Defenders,"
and of Atticus Finch, lawyer-hero of the civil-rights-era novel and
movie To Kill a Mockingbird. When I write here of gentlemen, please
remember to think of Dr. Craig and Mrs. Craig, of Lawrence Preston,
and of Atticus Finch.
Television would make my empirical point well enough, but in a
university I suppose I should also mention evidence that comes with
footnotes:
Item: Shirley Letwin's recent (1982) and careful study of gentle-
men in the novels of Anthony Trollope argues that the ethics of the
English gentleman transcend sex, wealth, and class, and the narrow-
er confines of English culture. Hers is an argument for the return of
the gentleman to ethics. Her claim is that the morals of the gentle-
man are interesting, that those of us who teach ethics in the universi-
ty would profit intellectually from taking the gentleman more
seriously. "The mark of a gentleman," Letwin says, with reference to
professional life, "is ... an ability to work conscientiously without
losing himself.",4 Letwin's choice of the prototypical Trollopian gent-
leman is Madame Max Goessler, later Mrs. Phineas Finn, of the
Palliser novels.
Item: Grant Tinder's recent (1976) study of the virtue of tolerance
is an account of the way gentlemen learn. He argues as a political
scientist; his claim is that learning, self-awareness, and civility in
communal life turn on a sound perception of human personality,
rather than on the "marketplace of ideas" that lawyers and political
thinkers in the United States have fashioned from the first amend-
ment to our constitution and from the philosophies of John Locke and
John Stuart Mill. Tinder wants to resituate tolerance as the virtue
that makes communities possible, communities in which a person can
find out who he is with truthfulness and with responsibility. Tinder
finds the notion of virtue more interesting than the prevailing civics
of autonomy and objectivity. He argues that Kantian theories of the
Douglas B. Faver, The Washington Post, Mar. 25,1984, p. B-7, col. 3; Editorial, id.,
p. C-6, col. 1. Richard L. Coe's eulogy of the late drama critic Brooks Atkinson,
"Atkinson: The Critic as Gentleman in the Audience," The Washington Post, Jan.
22, 1984, p. K-3, col. 1, said Mr. Atkinson "described succinctly and swiftly what
had happened the night before"; that is, what made him a gentleman was that he
was truthful. A similar standard is apparently at work, in a negative way, in
Laurel Leffs criticism of Georgia lawyers: "Lawyers themselves provide their
own best evidence for the decline of'gentlemanly' behavior." Savvy, Feb. 1984, p.
56. The intended irony is in the fact that the adjective is put in quotation marks.
We know what the word means and we are being told that when Miss Leff uses it
she doesn't mean what it means.
4 Shirley Robin Letwin, The Gentleman in Trollope: Individuality and Moral
Conduct (1982), at 122.
4 Queen's Law Journal
isolated but fungible individual, and Kant's distinction between
questions of value and questions of fact, are useless and dishonest.
Tinder, in other words, puts social morality and perception into a
cultural context; he argues that people are not interchangeable and
that political theories that claim objectivity tend to be corrupting of
what we are and what we are able to become. His is "a search for being
in the space between persons," a search in which each of us is "bound
by his institutions and beliefs, but not bound absolutely." He says
that "one must divest oneself of both indifference and fury" if he
wants to live with other people.5 Tinder describes Dr. Craig's world; it
is a world where being able to see is a moral process, a process that
depends on listening and learning: Dr. Craig often does not do the
right thing at first; his moral excellence is in his ability to perceive
the situation differently as he goes along. For example, he welcomed
a television crew because publicity appealed to his ego, but he later
expelled them from the hospital when he saw that the producer
valued his film more than he valued the suffering patients at St.
Eligius.
Item: Alasdair MacIntyre published in 1982 his influential book
After Virtue, which is half an attack on the fragmented morality that
philosophy has described for us since Immanuel Kant announced his
fact-value distinction and his categorical imperative, and half a brief
for Aristotle's ethics. MacIntyre would restore to professional ethics
the study of the virtues.6 The virtues are the moral qualities of the
gentleman. Aristotle found them in the Athenian man of practical
wisdom.7 Sir John A. Macdonald's generation of North Americans8
found them in Lord Baden-Powell: A Scout, you may recall, is trust-
worthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful,
thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. Those are virtues; the Scout Law
is a morality of virtues. The Scout, like Aristotle's man of practical
wisdom, is a gentleman.
Item: A formidable school of moral theology has been developing
since the 1930s, among Protestants, Jews, and Roman Catholics,
which argues that character is the fundamental category for defining
the Jewish and Christian way of life. Character was the unspoken
claim in Joseph Fletcher's popular Situation Ethics (1966); it has
more recently been the spoken claim in the religious ethics of Stanley
5 Grant Tinder, Tolerance: Toward a New Civility (1976).
6 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (1982).
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Bk. 6, ch. 5(c), pp. 152-154 (Martin Ostwald trans.
1962).
8 Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician (1952).
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Hauerwas, 9 James McClendon, 0 and Michael Goldberg." Character
has come to medical ethics in the work of Hauerwas,"2 Larry
Churchill,1 3 James Childress,' 4 and William May,' 5 and to legal
ethics in the work of those who find Lawrence Preston and Atticus
Finch more interesting than the deliberations of the American Bar
Association or the Law Society of Upper Canada. 6 Character as a
focus for ethics turns on personal qualities or dispositions, on what
the medieval writers translated as good habits, on what some of the
modern students of character would call skills. All of these are words
for virtues. Character turns on virtues more than on rules and
principles:
17
In recent years... many have challenged the decision-point model of morality.
'Character ethics' emphasizes that the foundation ofour decision lies in the peculiar
virtues and habits that each of us brings to a moral problem. Character ethicists
think the decision-point model of morality is reductionist, because it ignores how
difficult it is to discern the nature of relevant facts in the first place....
For those who speak of an ethics of vision or character, the main problem of the
moral life is not so much the rational calculation of the rightness or wrongness of
actions as it is the self-deception and egocentrism that can arise from insecurity to
block honest self-awareness and to distort our vision of others and the world about
us. This concern leads character ethicists to emphasize a set of problems which the
decisional account of ethics tends to ignore. This group of thinkers tries to inculcate
respect for certain attitudes and virtues. They are not really concerned about
prescribing norms for action; the terrain they are concerned about lies in the realm
of life-stance, truthfulness and responsibility....
9 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection
(1974); Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (1975); A
Community of Character: Toward A Constructive Christian Social Ethic (1981);
The Peaceable Kingdom (1983).
10 James McClendon, Biography as Theology (1974).
11 Michael Goldberg, Theology and Narrative: A Critical Introduction (1982).
12 Note 9 supra, especially Vision and Virtue; Truthfulness and Tragedy (1977).
13 See discussion of his medical ethics in my On Being a Christian and a Lawyer
(1981), at 130-132.
14 James F. Childress, Who Should Decide? Paternalism in Health Care (1982);
"Metaphors and Models of Medical Relationships," VIII Social Responsibility:
Journalism, Law, Medicine 47 (L. Hodges, ed., 1982).
15 Notes on the Ethics of Doctors and Lawyers (1977).
16 Id.' I proposed a theoretical model, based on Hauerwas and McClendon, in
"Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics," 33 Mercer Law Review
877 (1982). H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self An Essay in Christian
Moral Philosophy (1963), is seminal for the school of religious ethics described in
notes 9-16; see my discussion of Niebuhr in "Moral Implications and Effects of
Legal Education, or: Brother Justinian Goes to Law School," (1984), 34 Journal of
Legal Education 190, at 201.
17 William French, "Auden's Moral Comedy: A Late-Winter Reading," (1982), 99
The Christian Century 207-208.
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Because the standard model of morality focuses on the moment of decision, it
sometimes makes the moral dimension of our lives sound far more exciting and
dramatic than it really is. It paints a picture of tragic vigils, of Byronic heroes
overcoming moral ambiguity. Somewhere along the way the simple things... get
dropped out of this moral philosophy.
When we speak of the simple things, of character in professional
ethics, we speak of courage, temperance, friendship, civility, and
prudence; we speak ofjustice, too, but not as it is often spoken of in the
legal profession. We speak of justice as Tinder speaks of tolerance:
Justice is not something people get from lawyers or from the govern-
ment, it is something people learn how to give to one another. Dr.
Craig understands and practices justice in this way - as a virtue. He
made a little speech as he completed his first heart-transplant opera-
tion in November 1983: He spoke in the operating room, and spoke
not of his skill, nor of the hospital's technology, nor of the patient's
prognosis, but of the generosity of the young woman who donated her
heart for transplant. He praised her for her practice of the virtue of
justice. He then withdrew, alone and satisfied with himself, to a
private office, and refused to talk to the press. The lesson he wanted to
teach about justice was a lesson for his professional colleagues, not for
reporters. Dr. Craig wants to be a professional gentleman; he joins
the literary critic, the political scientist, the philosopher, and the
theologians. With them, he invites us to consider the ethics of the
gentleman in the operating room and in the courtroom.
* * *
I am not endorsing Dr. Craig's moral position, but I am proposing
that we take it seriously. This will involve a description of what his
ethic implies for the professions, and then some tests of its adequacy:
(1) Will the gentleman's ethic survive delusions of class and profes-
sionalism? (2) Will it provide the skills we need for dealing with
power and, particularly in the professions, with the power of institu-
tions? (3) Does it take into account the tragic nature of the moral life?
(4) Does it give adequate consideration to the moral significance of
suffering?
A DESCRIPTION OF THE GENTLEMAN'S ETHIC
The primary way we know gentlemen is that we just do. General
Robert E. Lee was a gentleman. Chief Justice Bora Laskin was a
gentleman. Prime Minister Lester Pearson was a gentleman. Trol-
lope's Dr. Thorne was a gentleman. So was Plantagenet Palliser, the
young Duke of Omnium, although his uncle, the old duke, was not.
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt was a gentleman. So were Senator Henry
Jackson and Chief Justice Earl Warren, and, of course, Madame Max
Goessler.
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This photo-album method of describing the gentleman is accurate.
But it succeeds only because we know before we start what a gentle-
man is. I once asked my students in legal ethics how a gentleman
knows what is the right thing to do; the answer Dr. Craig or Atticus
Finch would have liked best was that a gentleman knows that what
he will do is the right thing to do. That is true; thus, Jem Finch,
Atticus Finch's 12-year-old son, has entered upon a rite of passage
when he says to his little sister, "Atticus is a gentleman. And so am I."
Jem's point is both a matter of knowing who the gentleman is, and of
knowing that he can safely choose to be influenced by gentlemen. 18
Jem displays something Samuel Butler wrote: "We are not won by
arguments that we can analyse but by tone and temper, by the
manner which is the man himself."19
There are alternatives to picture-album definitions: One of them is
to describe the gentleman teleologically. Alasdair MacIntyre ex-
plains this alternative, and appropriates the metaethics of Plato and
Aristotle, when he says:
20
If a human life is understood as a progress through harms and dangers, moral and
physical, which someone may encounter and overcome in better and worse ways
and with a greater or lesser measure of success, the virtues will find their place as
those qualities the possession and exercise of which generally tend to success in this
enterprise and the vices as qualities which likewise tend to failure.
Teleological analysis depends on an understanding of where one's life
is headed. MacIntyre implies that the end or telos of the enterprise
might be said to be the good life itself. Dick Francis quotes a British
horseman who said, "When I look back on my life on the Turf, I am
astonished at how many men I have known that you could bet your
life on their doing the right thing."2 1 He didn't mention their devotion
to racing; what was important to him was their effort to be good. If you
look at the deepest and best of the lawyers, nurses, doctors, teachers,
and scientists C.P. Snow wrote about, you will find them saying that
the hardest job, and the job they most want to do well, is to become
good people. Many of them sacrifice professional success in that
journey toward goodness, and many choose poorly because their vices
keep them from seeing the road ahead.
18 It is a cultural point: "Of course, appeals can be made to particular individuals as
paradigms of the moral life.., but moral geniuses are never sufficient to sustain
our best moral convictions. For sustenance, we need a community to direct
attention toward, and sustain the insights of, those who have become more nearly
good." Stanley Hauerwas, "On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological," supra
note 2, at 16, 35.
19 Quoted in Forbes, Dec. 5, 1983, p. 304.
20 Supra note 6, at 135.
21 Heywood Hale Broun's review of Banker, Washington Post Book World, Mar. 27,
1983, p. 1, col. 3.
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A third way to describe the gentleman's life is to catalogue the
qualities we admire in gentlemen. That is what Letwin does in her
brief for the gentlemen in Trollope's novels. This is not really a third
way so much as a specification of the first way. When we enumerate
the qualities of a gentleman, we start with the understanding that
some people are gentlemen and some are not, and we then try to
notice the characteristics of those we identify as gentlemen. This was
Aristotle's procedure.
For one thing, Letwin says, the gentleman is civil.22 John Henry
Newman said that the gentleman hates to inflict pain.23 Scout Finch
said her father was so civil that he could make a trial for rape as dry as
a sermon. 2Trollope's Dr. Thorne was discharged as physician for the
children of Squire Gresham and his wife Lady Arabella because he
was not a fashionable doctor; but he was called in again when two
children died at the hands of Thorne's fashionable rival, Dr. Fill-
grave. Lady Arabella asked Dr. Thorne to come back and "humbled
herself, or would have done so, had the doctor permitted her. But he,
with his eyes full of tears, stopped the utterance of her apology, took
her two hands in his, pressed them warmly, and assured her that his
joy in returning would be great, for the love he bore to all that
belonged to Greshamsbury. ' '2' General Robert E. Lee said that a
gentleman cannot help being humbled himself when he has to hum-
ble others: He can forgive; he can forget; he can let the past be but the
past.26 General Lee left an important legacy to the post-bellum South
in the United States when he welcomed Union officers and their
families back to the Virginia mountain resorts, and when he let it be
known that he would not tolerate criticism of his late enemy, General
Ulysses S. Grant.2 7
The gentleman is self-possessed. Letwin says, for example, that his
sexual morals are the result of his keeping his thoughts straight, 28
and Dr. Craig would agree. If you are a fancier of Trollope's stories,
you may think here of Trollope's ladies, and, maybe, of John Gray,
Alice Vavasour's lover, sometime fiance, and finally husband, in Can
You Forgive Her? John is passionately in love with Alice, but he never
loses his composure. He is not very exciting, either; I suppose that's
why Alice needs to be forgiven. John Gray is unlike Dr. Craig and
22 Supra note 4, ch. 6.
23 The Idea of a University (1852) 179-180 (Oxford ed. 1976).
24 Supra note 18.
25 Doctor Thorne (Dent ed. 1908), at 33.
26 IV D. Freeman. Robert E. Lee (1935), at 499.
27 Charles Bracelen Flood, Lee: The Last Years (1981), at 160-167, 188.
28 Supra note 4, at 155.
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Madame Max Goessler in that respect. I am without parallel informa-
tion about General Lee and Atticus Finch.
The gentleman is steady in social and political leadership. In Let-
win's phrase, he dreams of something better and fears something
worse.2 9 Leadership - and every form of power - is to him a matter
not of merit but of circumstance. This is not quite noblesse oblige,
which regards power as appropriate and seeks to justify having it.
The gentleman's notion is more that power, whether appropriate or
not, is a circumstance - a fact - and that the moral way to cope with
the fact of power is to regard it as a form of service. This is not the
same as saying that power obliges the powerful to serve.3 °
The center of the gentleman's social morality is a response to what
happens - not a reaction, but a response. He is able to respond; he
believes, as Letwin says it, that "a human being leads himself to do
everything he does."3 1 The fact that the gentleman tends to excess in
his responsibility is a pervasive difficulty in his ethic; he is sometimes
so determined to provide protection to the weak that he protects the
weak who are not weak. That excess, to which I will return more
carefully when I discuss my fourth test, provides a clue to under-
standing how the old South in the United States could have been both
a place of gentlemen and a place of shameful racism. It helps us
understand how the Victorian English gentleman was deceived into
supporting notions such as the white man's burden. It provides as
well a clue to the professional gentleman's arrogance and pater-
nalism.
29 Id., 214-215.
30 Karl Barth, Ethics (1928-1929), at 169 (G. Bromiley trans. 1981): "The command
which assigns me my calling gives me no assurance that things will go well with
me in it, that I have a right to do better than others .... Just because the command
of God can.., put me in a privileged place, the question is always acute whether I
am in fact privileged ... or whether... [if I am] one who violates respect for the
life of others, whether my legitimately occupied and defended place of pri-
vilege ... is an insolent usurpation. If within the civil order... I occupy a position
in which... I stand in the sun... I cannot excuse myself ... that in virtue of my
calling I have claim that this should be so." From a theological point of view,
service is the consequence of the discovery that one has power. Id. 420, 421-440;
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111/4 (T. and T. Clark ed. 1961), pp. 470-564; see
my essay, "The Legal Ethics of Servanthood," VIII SocialResponsibility: Journal-
ism, Law, Medicine 34 (L. Hodges, ed., 1982). This view of power has implications
for the way power is exercised - a matter, perhaps, of making a virtue of
diffidence. See note 36 infra. Henry Mitchell, "The Fulbright Vantage," The
Washington Post, May 6, 1984, p. C-1, col. 1, at p. C-9, col. 1 (of former Senator J.
William Fulbright): "[H]is voice has made it impossible for him to mesmerize
millions or to draw to himself the crowd that seeks frantically for some new savior.
He is, in fact, a gentleman."
31 Supra note 4, at 59.
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The gentleman is, despite such devastating examples to the con-
trary, discriminating. "When faced with transgressors," Letwin says,
"he will consider whether he is faced with an eccentric, a ruffian, or a
villain."32 He may, accordingly, smile, get his horse whip, or call the
police. Much of Madame Goessler's success as a gentleman was the
exercise of a remarkable and intelligent imagination in this respect
- that and a meticulous respect for personality. She shows in her
story what Tinder describes as the virtue of tolerance. Atticus Finch
described this quality of discrimination more humbly when he said
you have to get inside the other fellow's skin: We are not all alike.
Lewis Thomas's father, an old-fashioned family doctor, showed how
this works when he parked his car around the corner from the house
of his Christian-Scientist patient.33
The gentleman is also diffident. He is firm in his morals but not
without doubt about them. Letwin says he has "the capacity to take a
firm stand while recognizing that the rightness of doing so is
questionable."3 She alludes to Kant's famous example of the
murderer who pursues his victim and asks the bystander which way
the victim went. The bystander, if he is a gentleman, "will lie to a
murderer in order to save his friend, [but] his honesty will keep him
from pretending ... he has not lied. 35 This is also a matter, as Tinder
put it, not of compromise but of waiting for the other: I am, when I act
with gentlemanly diffidence, aware of things I cannot know. One of
these things is who I am; another is who the other person is. I may be
able to perceive that the other person is like me, though, and
although he sees me as an object, and I see him as an object, it is
possible for each of us, in freedom, to learn to see the other as a
subject. What I will have, then, is the consciousness which Tinder
calls awareness, even though I will not have objective knowledge. My
awareness, even though I will not have objective knowledge. My
awareness is not abstract; it is not determined: From it comes what
Martin Buber called the heavenly bread of self-being, because aware-
ness of the other, and the gentleman's awareness of himself, are
reciprocal: One is possible because of the other. Diffidence, a stuffy
word that seems to describe nothing more than self-effacement, is the
gentleman's way to self-realization in his community. 6
32 Id. at 69.
33 Lewis Thomas, The Youngest Science 12 (Bantam ed. 1983). Thomas says that the
essential skill for family medicine was and is "the gift of affection"; id. at 56-57.
34 Supra note 4 at 71; Lewis Thomas, supra note 33 at 54, observes that the word
"medicine" and the word "modest" have the same root.
35 Supra note 4 at 72.
36 Iris Murdoch prefers the word humility. Supra note 17; Iris Murdoch, "On 'God'
and 'Good'" (1969), in Hauerwas and Maclntyre, supra note 2 at 68.
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Test No. 1: Will the Gentleman's Ethic Survive the Delusions of
Class and of Professionalism?
The 19th century gentleman in North America gave us slavery,
Manifest Destiny, the theft of half of Mexico, the subjugation of
women, the exploitation of immigrant children, Pinkerton detec-
tives, yellow-dog contracts, and the implacable genocide of American
Indians. You could make a case - Dr. Craig and Shirley Letwin to the
contrary notwithstanding - that the gentleman's ethic is not worth
taking seriously. If the gentleman has left the professions, the best
thing for us would be to bar the door lest he get back in. When I
proposed this as a lecture topic, a kind Canadian advisor wrote to me:
There are those ... who see appeals to gentlemen's ethics as anachronistic and
unsuited to contemporary Canadian conditions in the professions. They may see
appeals to preserve such a system as attempts to perpetuate an unethical system.
Does the continuance of a system of gentlemen's ethics imply and even require the
continuance of a socially and economically privileged class... ?
The gentlemen's ethic is either inherently useless or it has been
corrupted. Gentlemen have at best deceived themselves, often and
thoroughly. At best, the gentleman enjoys a satisfaction he does not
deserve, as the gentlemen of 16th century England did: When the
Duke of Norfolk was trying to get Robert Bolt's Sir Thomas More to
agree to the Oath of Succession, he told More that the nobility of
England had all taken the oath; More said that the nobility of Eng-
land would have snored through the Sermon on the Mount.3 7
One response to this melancholy heritage is empirical: The gentle-
man is the most vivid and enduring figure in professional ethics. Not:
Should be. But: Is. The gentleman is everywhere. He shines, for
example, through the earliest statements of moral standards for
lawyers in the United States. 38 He lurks in later, more pragmatic,
more influential statements on legal ethics. 39 His ethic is implicit in
all of the legal-ethics codes, from Judge Thomas Goode Jones's 1887
Alabama Code, through all of the Canons and Codes and Rules of the
American Bar Association, to the Code of Professional Conduct.
The gentleman is the lawyer's and physician's ethical heritage and
tradition. We cannot get away from him. He looks down on us from
the walls of courthouses, hospitals, and schools. His is the statue in
the village square; his name is over the main doors of our university
buildings; his is the enduring image in our hero stories, from Sinclair
37 Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons (1962) at 71.
38 Notably David Hoffman's "Resolutions on Professional Deportment," in A Course
of Legal Study (2nd ed. 1836).
39 Notably George Sharswood's "Essay on Professional Ethics" of 1854, (1907), 32
Reports of theAmerican BarAssociation; and Thomas Goode Jones's 1887 Alaba-
ma Code, (1899), 118 Alabama Reports xxiii.
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Lewis's Arrowsmith to "St. Elsewhere," from forgotten novels about
antebellum lawyers to "The Defenders" and "Perry Mason." We can-
not abolish the gentleman's ethic from the professions. We could more
easily abolish our grandparents. We cannot even choose against it. As
William Faulkner's lawyer, Gavin Stevens, said, "The past is not
dead; it is not even past.
4 0
Another response, and a way to come to terms with the first
response, is to admit that the noblest of moralities is neglected - that
is the meaning of Thomas More's point about the nobility of England
sleeping through the Sermon on the Mount: In the curious dynamics
of self-deception, the nobler the morality the more likely it is that it
will be corrupted.4 ' Still, there is a difference between a corrupt
morality and a corrupted morality. There is a difference between the
racism of Hitler and the racism of Rudyard Kipling. It may be that the
gentleman's morality, a thing as old as Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics, can be described carefully enough that its persistence in our
professions will be admirable.
An issue, then, will be whether it can survive our tendency to lord
it over one another. This is a stern test. No less a lover of gentlemen
than John Henry Newman voted against the gentleman on this issue.
Newman's antagonist Charles Kingsley spoke of the honest British
gentry, and said they
4 2
Do the work that's nearest
Though it's dull at whiles
Helping, when we meet them,
Lame dogs over stiles.
Newman admired that modest righteousness. He said he admired all
of the noble qualities of the gentleman, but he concluded that those
noble qualities were too fragile to be an adequate morality; they were
not adequate to the terrors of life. The gentleman's virtues, Newman
said,43
are no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness; they may attach to the
man of the world, the profligate, the heartless. Quarry the granite rock with razors,
or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and
delicate instruments to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of
man.
I think we have to figure out whether Newman was right: Can the
gentleman's ethic survive the passion and the pride of man?
40 Requiem for a Nun (Random House ed. 1951), at 92.
41 Herbert Fingarette, Self Deception (1969); Hauerwas, supra note 192 (Truthful-
ness), at 82.
42 Philip Mason, The English Gentleman: The Rise and Fall of An Ideal (1982), at
185.
43 Quoted id., at 187.
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Newman's question is, today, mostly a question about professional
pride and passion, rather than the dangers of class. None of those
arguing recently for the ethics of virtue make an argument for an
elite class. Worrying over that issue would beat a dead horse. Silas
Lapham was right when he said, in 1884: "Gentlemaning as a profes-
sion has got to play out in a generation or two. 44 It did play out. That
isn't to say we don't have classes; it is to say that the moral defense of
classes is no longer interesting in ethics. We modern romantics might
thus declare our independence from Trollope and from what Ben-
jamin Disraeli called the muscular Christians of Victorian Britain.4 5
The way we certify our superiority now is not through class but
through profession. Lionel Trilling noticed this of C.P. Snow's de-
scription of"the new men," scientists who work for the government -
"men who, by their talents, have risen from.., the lower classes." In
their new professional world, "differences of social origin are mod-
ified by the attitudes of the scientific group. Thus, all the physicists,
no matter what their social origin, are at one in their alienation from
the engineers, whom they regard as of a lower social order., 46 This
sorting out is familiar to all of us who observe the hierarchies within
and among modern professions. It is even clearer in its distinction
between professionals and their clients, where professionalism
means superiority, disengagement (which we call objectivity), and
the social processes in which we divide people up and hand the parts
over to experts: "We must ... see," Jung said, "whether we cannot
learn something from the medical philosophers of a remote past when
body and soul had not yet been torn asunder and handed over to
separate faculties., 47 Lewis Thomas, reflecting on his father's gen-
eration of family doctors, says that the essence of medicine then was a
"uniquely subtle, personal relationship" between doctor and patient
that "has roots that go back to the beginnings of medicine's history
... it takes," he says, "the best of doctors, the best of friends. 48
The moral danger here is idolatry - seeing one's job where one
ought to see God. Howells's Boston businessman Silas Lapham was
accused of this; his wife Persis said, "You have made paint your god,
and you couldn't bear to let anybody else share in its blessings."4 9
Silas had the good sense to be worried about that. If such an idolatry
44 William Dean Howells, The Rise ofSilas Lapham (1885), Signet ed. 1963, at 34.
45 Discussed supra note 42, ch. 11 and ch. 14.
46 Lionel Trilling, "The Novel Alive or Dead," in A Gathering of Fugitives (1957), at
125, 129-131.
47 Psychological Reflections 74 (J. Jacobi, ed., 1953) (Harper Torchbooks ed. 1961);
supra note 15.
48 Supra note 33, at 60.
49 Supra note 44, at 45.
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seems ridiculous to lawyers, we ought to reflect on what we have done
with the adversary ethic, in which we so worship a bureaucratic
system that it can be - and is - seriously argued that the system has
the power to license us to lie, to cheat, and to abuse other people.
Professionalism in this way takes the place formerly filled by class,
wealth, and breeding; occupation becomes a god; and success in the
occupation becomes a moral compass. This is the meaning I find in the
fact that reports about the Bar in Ontario say that young lawyers lose
their sense of worth when there are too many of them and their
profesional income declines.5" (It seems that the professional god is
best worshipped from the front pews.) But that kind ofjobism cannot
be blamed on the gentleman. It came about because of the rejection of
the gentleman's ethic. The gentleman tests occupation against self-
hood, not selfhood against occupation. A gentleman can be a profes-
sional, as he can be a tradesman; the ethical question is not his job,
but whether he is disposed "to reduce all of life to the calculation of
profits and losses. .", 51 whether his fascination with the arcana of
his calling leads him to forget how a gentleman behaves.
The adversary ethic implies a loss of self."2 So does professional
detachment in medicine: "The personality of the patient demands the
personality of the doctor," Jung said.53 The source of the professional
idol in the last century has not been the gentleman's ethic but neglect
of the gentleman's ethic. We developed a preference for what Letwin
calls the self-divided man; but we did it over the objection of gentle-
men. Professional gentlemen in the 19th century did look to the
professions as moral teachers, but they did so because the profession-
al ethic was a gentleman's ethic; as long as the gentleman was there,
in the professional ethic, and behind it, and beyond it, the idol was
kept out. There are, I think, four ways in which this can still be so, in
which the gentleman's ethic can survive the delusions of elitism and
can keep the professional idol out. These are tradition, crafts-
manship, liberal education, and doing something about patriarchy.
(a) Tradition. Ancestry and ownership, being what Aunt Alexan-
dra (in To Kill a Mockingbird) called a person of background, have
been important in the gentleman's ethic. But they have not been
50 Conference report, "Are There Too Many Lawyers?" (1983), 6 Canada-United
States Law Journal 98, and Roger D. Yachetti, "The Views of the Practicing Bar,"
id., at 103. I have thought that the American Bar Association's treatment of the
advertising issue was similarly idolatrous. "Moral Theology in Legal Ethics"
(1982), 12 Capital University Law Review 179, at 182.
51 Supra note 4, at 118.
52 John T. Noonan, Jr., "Other People's Morals: The Lawyer's Conscience" (1981), 48
Tennessee Law Review 227.
53 Supra note 47, at 77.
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essential. Dr. Thorne had ancestry but not ownership; Phineas Finn,
the son of an Irish doctor, had neither. Both wanted to be gentlemen.
Lizzie Eustace, who had both ancestry and ownership, was not a
gentleman; Lord Chiltern, who had both, was. What kept Lizzie from
being a gentleman was not origin but behavior. (I confess to using
the word "gentleman" selectively, as Trollope did, because 1 am
talking about ethics, not social science; I am using the word as it is
used to discuss character, not position. In the same way we talk about
"the good life" - sometimes as indicating character, and sometimes
as meaning prosperity or status.)
54
Tradition is the moral meaning in the gentleman's concern for
breeding. He does not regard himself as either an autonomous moral
agent or as a self-made person. He represents the values of his
culture; he preserves and honors the values of his culture. When he
stands against his community, his moral argument is the moral
argument of Jesus against the Pharisees, or of Isaiah against the
temple priesthood: He accuses the community of dishonoring its
moral inheritance. That was the position of Atticus Finch,5 5 of Judge
Horton in the Scottsboro Cases,56 and of Faulkner's lawyer Gavin
Stevens, against the racism of the 1930s in the South. It is the
argument of many in Israel against the current excesses of the poli-
tical and military leadership there. 7 The gentleman recalls the
community to its heritage; he insists that those in institutions look at
what they're doing and not behave as if events were too big or too
complicated for them. Tradition is the moral meaning of a person's
life in his community: "Experience is not what happens to a man,"
Letwin says; "it is what he does with what happens to him."58 And,
first, perhaps, how he understands what happens to him.
54 A new (1984) book on etiquette, called Don't, or Directions for Avoiding Im-
proprieties in Conduct and Common Errors of Speech, by "Censor" (Oliver Bell
Bunce), says: "Don't misuse the words lady and gentleman. Don't say 'A nice lady.'
If you must use the word nice, say 'A nice woman.' Don't say 'A pleasant gentle-
man,' says 'An agreeable person.' Say 'What kind of a man is he?' not 'What kind of
gentleman is he?' Say 'She is a good woman' not 'a good lady.' The indiscriminate
use of lady and gentleman indicates a want of culture. These terms should never
be used when sex pure and simple is meant." Quoted in Mary Ellin Arch's review,
Roanoke Times and World News, April 15, 1984, p. F-4.
55 See my "The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch" (1981), 42 University ofPittsburgh
Law Review 171.
56 Supra note 13, ch. 14.
57 Martin Buber warned before 1918 that Zionism might lead to making an idol of
the Jewish state: "Not the men who would let us serve the true God in an alien
land are the assimilationists, but you who would readily approve any idol-worship
if only the idols bear Jewish names!" On Judaism (1967), at 135.
58 Supra note 4, at 59; see my "The Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms" (1983), 17
Valparaiso University Law Review 1, at 27-39.
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One of Dr. Craig's more subtle arguments is that these are times
that need the professional gentleman's esteem for tradition. I am
impressed with how sensible for modern lawyers are David Hoff-
man's 1836 "Resolutions for Professional Deportment." I am im-
pressed by medicine's recent discovery of something Dr. Thorne or
Lewis Thomas's father took for granted - the undissected patient. As
Jung said, "Every illness is ... an unsuccessful attempt at
healing."5 9 This is not being old-fashioned. I hope it is a clear-headed
consideration of what we have been - because that is what we are.
Letwin says, "Conventional judgments may be defied, but anyone
who has the wisdom and strength to do so will also recognize their
value."60 Tinder speaks of this sense of moral culture as "the very
continuance of historical life."'"
(b) Craftsmanship. Alasdair MacIntyre fashions from Aristote-
lian ethics a professional moral tradition he calls the practice. The
notion turns on a distinction between two kinds of benefits we gain
from the pursuit of our callings, one external (e.g., money, and the
good regard of our neighbors), the other internal. Internal benefits
relate to the joy of doing what we do, of sharing that joy with our
colleagues, and of subjecting what we do to the standards of perform-
ance we inherit, preserve, and pass on in a profession.6 2 An example
is what in business is called a trade secret: We doctors and lawyers do
not have trade secrets. If one of us discovers something, or thinks he
has discovered something, he turns it over to the profession - for use,
for evaluation, and for improvement. If one of us fails to do that, he is
considered unprofessional. We say to him - in our professional
arrogance - that he might as well be in trade. Such professional
traditions are what I mean by craftsmanship. When our activity in
locating, testing, and promulgating our knowledge is done with hon-
esty and civility, the practice is a way to the good life; it is a theatre for
virtue; it honors our professional ancestors and admits that we are
indebted to them; it might even reach beyond professional fashion
and fad and give each of us a way to learn who he is.
If we keep our metaphors straight, the practice is also a way to
avoid the delusions of professionalism. Craftsmanship, for example,
if not art; when we call it art, we withdraw it from the honesty and
civility of evaluation and use by our colleagues; we begin to think
that what we do is too special for them. Craftsmanship is not merely
59 Supra note 47, at 82.
60 Supra note 4, at 133.
61 Supra note 5, at 50.
62 Supra note 6, at 175-183. William Dean Howells's novel A Modern Instance (1882)
illustrates MacIntyre's insight in its description of the fraternity ofjournalists in
Boston.
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work, either. Work, understood in the diminished way we have come
to describe the Protestant work ethic, is too weak a metaphor. We
excise the mystery from what we do when we come to think of it only
as work, and of our doing it as only a job.63 We lose the original
meaning of the work ethic - John Calvin's image of the world as a
theatre for the glory of God.64 And a diminished view of what we do
leads us to the delusion that we are not responsible for what our
institutions do.
(c) Liberal Education. John Henry Newman valued liberal educa-
tion but did not exalt it.6 5 C.S. Lewis probably captured Newman's
mood when he said that liberal culture is not Jerusalem but may be
on the road to Jerusalem.6 6 Lewis Thomas claims that the doctor who
values learning is or should be a professional ideal in medicine.6 7 My
present point is that liberal learning helps save us from idolatry: We
are solemn in our work, but, as Karl Barth said, we are only children
playing before God.68
Liberal learning should help us remember that the benefits we
bring to others are less important than we think; it is defensible,
then, to provide in the community a professional function which does
not serve "the whole man." But we can get away with that only when,
in the community, we take responsibility for the whole man. It is
defensible for me to defend my client against a drunk-driving charge
if I am also alert to the fact that his alcoholism will not be cured in
traffic court, and if I am concerned for - responsible for - his being
more than either a drunk or a client of mine. When Dr. Craig's
heart-transplant patient died, he grieved for her - not for his or the
hospital's want of skill, but for Eve, his patient, who was dead. He
shed a tear for his friend. He spoke to a young colleague about his
three decades as a doctor: "I know now how people die," he said. "But I
still don't know why." Liberal learning helps us to see the commun-
ity, and the mystery of the human person, with diffidence but also
with responsibility. It helps us to begin to remember that we are not
defenseless against evil, and that our professionalism is not enough
for moral life.
63 My "Henry Knox and the Moral Theology of Law Firms" (1981) 38 Washington
and Lee Law Review 347, develops this argument both as to art and as to work, in
reference to Louis Auchincloss's novel The Great World and Timothy Colt.
64 "Institutes of the Christian Religion," Bk. I, ch. v; in 20 Library of Christian
Classics 56-58 (John T. McNeill and Ford Lewis Battles, eds., 1960).
65 Supra note 23; supra note 42.
66 Particularly in his essay "Christianity and Culture," discussed in my On Being a
Christian and a Lawyer, ch. 15 (1981).
67 "How to Fix the Pre-Medical Curriculum," in The Medusa and the Snail (1979), at
137-141.
68 Supra note 30, at 223.
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(d) Doing Something About Patriarchy.69 "Gentleman" is a mas-
culine word.7 ° The English culture that produced and esteemed the
gentleman appears to have wanted the word and the ethic to be
masculine - and not only masculine but patriarchal as well: Eng-
land wanted an ethic centered in the lives and values of older, white
men. If the words we use to describe this ethic now are as patriarchal
as ethical words were in, say, General Lee's day, the description will
be unpopular. In fact, if I persist in using such words, I will probably
learn that it is impossible to sustain the affectionate analysis of the
gentleman's ethic that I am attempting here.
One modern and relatively less sexist way to describe the gentle-
man's ethic would be to claim that it is, underneath and most deeply,
a feminine ethic. One might build such a claim on the analytical
psychology of Carl C. Jung, a psychology in which the unconscious of
a man, what Jung called the anima, 71 is feminine. One would expect,
then, to find feminine meaning in a masculine ethic. It is important to
attempt some such analysis, not primarily because it is important to
defend the gentleman's ethic but because the gentleman's ethic is
what we have in the professions, and it is virtually all that we have: It
is the only coherent professional ethic available that has any power to
persuade. The issue here is not nostalgia, but truthfulness.
There is a possibility, too, that understanding the gentleman's
ethic to include the feminine would give us a way to deal with other
dissonances it presents - its racism, for example; or its paternalism,
which is a prejudice against the young.72 Over all of this, and includ-
ing all of it, describing the feminine in the gentleman's ethic would be
a way to overcome the idolatry of professionalism; that is a profound
69 The professions of law and medicine in North America are and have been domin-
ated by older white men. The sources of our professional ethics teach that this is
morally appropriate; supra notes 38 and 39. "Patriarchy" suggests that profes-
sional inheritance; I mean also to suggest deeper, religious roots, particularly in
Hebraic scripture: Rosemary Radford Ruether, New Woman, New Earth (1975);
Rebecca Oxford-Carpenter, "Gender and Trinity" (1984), 41 Theology Today 7
(1984), and scholarship cited there.
70 Several friends have suggested to me that the Yiddish word "mensch" comes
closer than "gentleman" to the moral qualities I attempt here to describe. A letter
from Hyman Bookbinder, eulogizing his friend Clarence Mitchell, shows what
this word might do, were it of general currency in our culture: "Literally it means
'person.' But it means much more; it means a person with a heart, with compas-
sion, with sensitivity, with tolerance, with humility. Clarence Mitchell, even
when fighting relentlessly for specific goals, never abandoned civility and toler-
ance and respect. In every respect, he was a giant of a mensch." The Washington
Post, Mar. 25, 1984, p. C-6, col. 3.
71 Analytical Psychology 99 (1968); "The Psychology of the Transference," 16
Collected Works (2nd ed. 1966).
72 If one pursues the sources I indicated in note 69 supra, in feminist theology,
/
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possibility, I think, but it does not need arcane illustration: Such
old-fashioned women as Blondie Bumstead and Dottie Dripple show
us how it works.
An approach that is more direct and more ordinary than depth
psychology is to look carefully at the stories of gentlemen that Letwin
and McClendon and Hauerwas and I" use to describe the ethics of
character: These are all stories about virtuous women. Letwin notices
this in her work on Trollope, but, I think, she fails to understand its
implications. She correctly identifies Trollope's stories as stories
about virtuous women; she develops the arguments that Madame
Max was the prototypical gentleman and Lizzie Eustace the prototy-
pical cad. But she does not talk about the fact that neither was a man.
Letwin comes out saying, as one of my students did, "Ladies are
gentlemen, too"; the point is a conventional one about sexual equal-
ity. But I claim that there is more to these stories than that.
Letwin's territory is the six parliamentary novels. The cast of
women in those stories ranges from bright, often irreverent unmar-
ried women (Alice Vavasour, Violet Effingham) to wily widows
(Madame Max, Lizzie Eustace) to pitiable victims of arranged mar-
riages among the wealthy (Lady Glencora Palliser, Lucy Morris). The
feminist theme in these stories is that these able women are disabled
by their society. Most of them are informed about and interested in
politics, for example, but their action in politics has to be indirect and
is always unsure, because everything a woman does in public life has
to be approved by men. Unmarried women have to be calculating in
their plans for marriage, because a married woman loses control of
her life, her property, and even her ideals. (Lady Laura Standish,
later Kennedy, is a study in how that happens, as Alice Vavasour and
Madame Max are studies in how and why intelligent women are
wary.) And women cannot afford to be calculating if they have no
money; Lucy Morris, for example, has all of the moral qualities of the
impecunious and ambitious men in these stories - Phineas Finn or
Lucy's lover, Frank Greystock - but Lucy's choice is to marry or to be
a governess.
Trollope uses this social context to show how women in a gentle-
man's culture were virtuous; their way of being virtuous was differ-
ent, in large part because their disabilities were unique. Their
achievement of virtue was an achievement built on disability, rather
"woman becomes the symbol of the unknown possibility of a humanity beyond and
outside the entire system of such a world ... for the eschatological humanity of
the new convenant: that 'new thing' which God has created on earth, 'the female
overcomes the warrior.'" Reuther 58, quoting Jeremiah 31:32.
73 Supra notes 4, 9, 10, 12, 16, 55, and 63.
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than on the wealth, power, status, and security of being among the
ruling class in an imperial nation. The point of the stories, then, has
to do not only with the fact that these women were virtuous, but with
the fact that they were virtuous against conventional odds. The fact
that these women were outside power, and in that sense were not
gentlemen, is what Letwin's device ignores. If she had not ignored
that fact she would have been able to ask how these virtuous women
were outside, and how these outsiders were virtuous. And we might
then understand something about how the feminine in the stories of
gentlemen is a way to avoid the idolatry of professionalism and the
delusions of race and class that corrupted 19th century (male) gentle-
men. This agenda has much more to it than sexual equality. Here's a
story:
The gentleman-lawyer took on cultural identity in the United
States during the two generations after the American Revolution, the
period Willard Hurst called the golden era of American lawyers. This
was the infancy of the North American university law school as a
place to train lawyers. Women were barred from university law
schools. Most lawyers still, and despite the infancy of university law
schools, prepared for the profession by reading the law in law offices;
women were not barred from that sort of education, which was not
seriously regulated by anybody, but they were barred either from bar
examinations or, if admitted to and successful in examinations, from
admission to the bar. There was litigation in several of the United
States to force admission of women to the bar, as a matter of common-
law or constitutional right. The usual result was that women were
denied admission, often with quaint, condescending, maddeningjudi-
cial opinions that talked about law practice as vulgar and women as
delicate. The Supreme Court of the United States held that admission
to the bar was a matter for the states; there was no federal constitu-
tional right to due process of law or equal protection of the laws with
regard to admission to the legal profession.
One such case involved a woman from Chicago named Myra Brad-
well (1831-1894). She belonged to the generation just after Abraham
Lincoln's generation of male frontier lawyers. She and her husband
migrated to Chicago from Vermont; they raised a family in Chicago
and her husband James became a prominent lawyer, a judge, and a
member of the Illinois legislature. When her children were no longer
in diapers, Mrs. Bradwell read law and took and passed the Illinois
bar examination. She was denied admission to the bar, though, be-
cause she was a woman; her appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States was unsuccessful.7 4 She was finally admitted to the
74 Bradwell v. The State (1872), 83 U.S. 130 (S.C.U.S.).
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Illinois Bar in 1890, four years before her death, but she never
practiced law.
Mrs. Bradwell turned to professional activities that did not require
her to be licensed and, among other things, founded and operated the
Chicago Legal News, the first legal newspaper in the West; this
became for her a successful and prosperous business. She took on a
number of campaigns of legal reform and civic improvement in Illi-
nois. A paragraph in a 1976 book about American women suggests
that she spent her life more productively than if she had been practic-
ing law:
75
In part, perhaps, because as a woman she was an outsider, Myra was able to
perceive many ways in which the operation of the courts could be improved, and...
an impressive number of her suggestions were enacted into law. She campaigned
for clean courthouses ... suggested that real estate deeds be indexed ... encour-
aged bar associations to codify professional standards ... called for simplified
pleadings, better treatment of witnesses in trials, pensioning and retirement of
superannuated judges, and a law school education for all lawyers.
The argument made about Myra Bradwell in the bicentennial
essay was that she was a prophetic figure. She was prophetic - that
is, able to perceive the truth about conditions in the profession and
able to speak out about them - because she had been denied access to
the professional idol (and therefore it was not a professional idol for
her).76 There is implied in such an assessment the familiar view that
prophetic witness is more likely to exist in the absence of power,
status, and class than in the possession of these, the usual badges of
professionalism. Mrs. Bradwell's case involved women; Dr. Martin
Luther King's involved black people in the United States; the Talmud
says, "Ever since the destruction of the Temple the power of prophecy
has been given to children."77 The eternal types are the priestly
professional, who courts power, and the prophet at the gates, who
courts truth.78 Mrs. Bradwell's work was more valuable for her coun-"
try because she was outside, and she was outside only because she was
a woman.
But a prophet, while outside his culture, is also, always and unde-
niably, within and a part of his culture. That was true of Trollope's
heroines, married and unmarried, as it was true of the Hebrew
prophets and of the black preachers of the civil rights revolution in
the United States (King, Jackson, Young, Abernathy, Sullivan, and
all the rest).
75 Business and Professional Women's Foundation, Enterprising Women (1976).
76 Supra note 66, ch. 10, discusses the Hebraic notion of prophet.
77 Elie Wiesel, The Gates of the Forest 32 (Frances Franaye trans. 1982).
78 Supra note 57.
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The claim that Myra Bradwell was a prophet is a claim that goes
beyond conventional sexual equality (although, I think, it is not
inconsistent with conventional sexual equality). Prophets are a pro-
fession's truth tellers; they call the profession away from idolatry. If a
profession endures morally - as law and medicine have - it is saved
by its prophets and it develops ways to treasure the presence of
prophets. Thus medical ethics is taught in medical schools by non-
medical professionals (often teachers whose primary professional
training has been for the ministry). Legal ethics is pondered and
taught by academics who do not practice law. Ethics in education, and
particularly in public education, is relatively open to public and
parental and even prophetic scrutiny.
Finally, though, there has to be a way for such prophetic ethics to
come inside. Physicians and practicing lawyers have to speak about
the etbics they have from their outsider prophets. Or the outsiders
have to come inside even as they remain in some ways outsiders. As
Larry Churchill, writing about medicine, put it, ethics becomes
accountable when it develops within the professional person "the
capacity for self-restriction and self-criticism." If it remains outside,
and only there, "all questions raised... seem to be an attack and...
the healer's mantle [becomes] an aegis from the variety of values held
by his patients. It makes the physician an adversary of his patient
instead of an advocate., 79 Myra Bradwell, outside the legal profes-
sion, was valuable to lawyers and to the community she shared with
lawyers. Her granddaughter, as a lawyer, will not necessarily lose
the heritage she has from her grandmother; and she can add to it the
perspective and the power that comes from being inside. She might
come to terms with professional idolatry in ways that go beyond
sexual equality.
8 0
Test No. 2: Will the Gentleman's Ethic Provide the Skills We Need
for Dealing with Power and, Particularly in the Professions, with
the Power of Institutions?
The gentleman responds to coercion and the abuse of power with
integrity and with an appeal to the substantive values of his culture.
His character in such an encounter is, as Letwin puts it, "all of a
piece"; he acts, as Atticus Finch put it, the same way in town and at
home. He is, in Socrates's phrase, "one man instead of many." If, in his
integrity, he must respond with moral disapproval of others, the
79 Supra note 13.
80 Supra note 72. Lewis Thomas's mother was a nurse, his father a small-town
physician. Frequently patients would come in to consult the doctor, complete that
business, and wait until he left the office, so that they could consult the nurse.
Supra note 33, at 24.
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moral values he then describes are values he shares with those he
disapproves of. And even then his action is carried out with tolerance,
with habits of thought and of discourse that cause him to regard the
other person as a subject, not an object, as one who is to be waited for
as well as spoken to. Such qualities of reflection and discourse are
important to understanding how gentlemen cope with power, but
they are not, I think, an adequate test as this ethic comes up against
the aggregated power and wealth of institutions. They don't come to
terms with the passion and the pride of man.
We live, in W.H. Auden's phrase, on a moral planet tamed by
terror. It is the world in the biblical sense, a place where significant
movement occurs not as the result of truth but as the result of fear; its
values are the values of the stronger. The situation of the gentleman
in such a world results not from its evil and his virtue, but from the
fact that he is himself one of the stronger. He is himself an agent of
fear. Our institutions are in the hands of gentlemen. They are among
those who are corrupted by power. If the gentleman's ethic is of any
use on this point it will be because it is an ethic for accomplices.
The claim for the gentleman's ethic here will say that gentlemen
may be self-deceived but that their ethic does not evade complicity in
a systematic way: The gentleman tames with terror, too, but he does
not claim that events are beyond accountability. He is able to re-
spond. He keeps the issue of complicity alive. When the gentleman's
ethic has been adequate on this question of power, when it has been
distinctive among the ethics of those who rule, it has persisted in
telling the truth about complicity.
This claim is especially significant for legal ethics because
lawyers, as they worship the professional idol, have developed infor-
mal and formal ways to evade the issue of complicity. The occasion for
informal evasion is the fact that the government claims to seek truth
and justice through contention; its agent is the champion, who is
useful to the government because he seeks to win. This implies the
notion that law is what the government says it is; law is the argument
that wins. It is a short step, or no step at all, from such a political
system to an ethic that seeks to vindicate the dominance of one person
over another. In this way the gentleman-lawyer becomes an accom-
plice - informally.
For about a century the legal profession has also taken the formal
position that lawyers are not responsible for what their clients do.
This is a consequence of locating law and resolving disputes through
contention; the consequence is that, in providing the contention the
government seeks, a lawyer need not answer for what he does to other
people. Lord Brougham described this consequence, and then de-
fended it as an ethic, in Queen Caroline's Case: "An advocate," he
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said, "knows but one person.., and that person is his client. To save
that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs
to other persons ... is his first and only duty; and in performing this
duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction he
may bring upon others ... he must go on, reckless of consequences,
though it should be his unhappy lot to involve his country in
confusion."
8'
Brougham demanded a licence to be immoral. He justified his
demand with the argument that the state requires lawyers to serve in
an immoral manner a function imposed on them by the fact that the
government pursues truth and justice through contention. His was a
somebody-has-to-do-it argument.8 2 Trollope compared Brougham's
ethic with the ethics of an Irish assassin.8 3 The modern, organized
legal profession adopted it, and adapted to it, in the era of the robber
barons, 4 but we have never had a justification for it that would
persuade a child. And we have not accounted for our rejection of the
social ethic that prevailed in the old, unorganized profession: The
older social ethic turned on the lawyer's personal responsibility for
justice in government. Even less have we accounted for the abolition
of the notion that each lawyer is responsible for what he does; none is
entitled to regard himself as a victim of circumstances nor the gov-
ernment's need for contention as an occasion for being irresponsible.
An interesting and subtle example here is the recent (1983) deci-
sion of the Virginia State Bar to repeal the disciplinary rule that
requires a lawyer to reveal controlling legal authority to the court -
even and especially legal authority that weighs against his client's
position.8 5 The rule is the vestige of an older and broader principle
against arguing for a legal result that would be contrary to the
common good. As David Hoffman put it, in 1836: "Should the princi-
ple.., be wholly at variance with sound law, it would be dishonour-
81 Discussed in my "Lord Brougham the Devious Advocate," Res Gestae, Oct. 1983,
p. 27.
82 Supra note 9 (Peaceable Kingdom) 167, quoting John Howard Yoder, The Politics
of Jesus 243-244 (1972): "[Wihat Jesus renounced is not first of all violence, but
rather the compulsiveness of purpose that leads me to violate the dignity of
others." Somebody-has-to-do-it arguments are often most truthfully met by
asking whether somebody does have to do it. I take Dean Monroe Freedman -
note 108 infra - to argue from Kantian notions of autonomy, rather than from a
somebody-has-to-do-it premise.
83 Orley Farm (1862), at 359 (Oxford Press ed. 1935).
84 Michael Schudson, "Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The Correspondence
of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles," (1977), 21 American Journal of Legal
History 191.
85 Virginia State Bar Professional Handbook 53-54, (1984); E.C. 7-20, replacing
what is D.R. 7-106(B) in the A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(1981).
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able folly in me to endeavor to incorporate it into the jurisprudence of
the country." 6 Roger Brooke Taney, when he was attorney general of
Maryland, argued for a states-rights interpretation of the commerce
clause; when he was a judge he decided the issue the other way. He
then felt it necessary to explain that the difference was due to the fact
that he had changed his mind on what the rule ought to be; he did not
suppose it acceptable to argue one way when he was an advocate and
to decide the other way when he was a judge.
8 7
The rule the Virginia State Bar repealed was more modest; it
requires only that the advocate disclose authority when the judge is
in danger of erring through ignorance. In that modest form, it is a rule
of discipline in the rest of the United States. The Virginia State Bar,
arguing that Virginia lawyers disobey the rule, took it out of the
Virginia rules of discipline and put it in the ethical admonitions. That
was, I think, a capitulation to the adversary ethic. It is an instance of
what I mean by the systematic evasion of the issue of complicity. The
reason given was that professional moral standards are decadent;
Hoffman had a gentleman's answer for that reason: "What is wrong,"
he said, "is not the less so from being common."
8 8
Some gentlemen-lawyers have, of course, defended the adversary
ethic, soberly when their prosperity depended on it, and righteously
when they saw themselves as protecting the weak (including the
weak who are not even weak). But the issue of complicity persists; the
issue of what to do about complicity persists. The evasions don't work.
Stories of white gentleman-lawyers in the racially segregated South
are useful here. I think of lawyers such as Atticus Finch; James
Edwin Horton, so-called "good judge" of the Scottsboro Cases; the
federal judges Jack Bass called "unlikely heroes";89 and of Charles
Morgan, who has said that he practices law against order.90 The
moral appeal these lawyers make is to the values of Southern culture.
(That was also the moral appeal of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.9 1)
Their method is integrity. The challenge that they put to themselves
is that they must account for their complicity in the continuation of
slavery.
Faulkner's Intruder in the Dusk (1948) is a deep, complex mystery
story about this challenge. Gavin Stevens, Faulkner's gentleman-
lawyer, represents Lucas Beauchamp, a black man accused of
86 Supra note 38, Res. XIV.
87 Bernard C. Steiner, Life of Roger Brooke Taney (1922), 267-273.
88 Supra note 38, Res. XXIII.
89 Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes (1981).
90 F. Powledge, "Something for a Lawyer to Do," The New Yorker, Oct. 25, 1969, p.
63.
91 Supra note 10, ch. III.
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murdering a white man. Lucas insists that he did not do the deed.
Gavin does not believe him, and does not listen to him. Gavin is wrong
even under Lord Brougham's standards: He fails at what lawyers
pretentiously call "the administration of justice." Of more import-
ance to his view of himself, he fails to be a gentleman; he does not
practice the virtues ofjustice, civility, and tolerance; he does not wait
for the other. Gavin fails in both ways because he is in complicity with
his racist community. What marks Gavin as a gentleman nonethe-
less is that complicity remains a moral issue for him. The story
Faulkner tells is the story of what Gavin does about his complicity -
what he thinks he is able to do, which is to give Lucas a way to tell the
truth; and what he regrets not being able to do, which is to give his
community a way to tell the truth.92
Gavin is able to retain the issue of complicity because he is able to
hear his moral critics. He listens to, and is shown his error by, two
people: One is a boy, Chick, his nephew. The other is a brave old
woman, Miss Habersham, who makes Faulkner's argument that the
culture of the South values the justice and the courage needed to
overcome racism. Southern-gentleman stories frequently demons-
trate moral substance and bravery in this way, through old women.
(Another example is Atticus Finch's neighbor, Mrs. Dubose, who
teaches the Finch children what courage is. Southern gentleman-
hero stories are, as Trollope's stories are, in substantial part, stories
about virtuous women.)
The critical part of the moral substance, for present purposes, is
what the gentleman learns to do when he notices his complicity in
abuses of power. He learns how to repent; he learns how to repent
because his culture knows and teaches him how to repent. In Faulk-
ner's last story, The Reivers (1962), the grandfather's advice to the
boy, at the end of the story, is that a gentleman cries, but he always
washes his face. "A gentleman accepts the responsibility of his ac-
tions and bears the burden of their consequences," the grandfather
says, "even when he did not himself instigate them but only ac-
quiesced to them, didn't say No though he knew he should."
92 An ordinary moral opportunity for lawyers - to provide their communities a
way to tell the truth. Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Contemporary Moral Culture,"
C. C.I.C.A. Annual, 1982, p. 26 .This in turn is one of the ways the culture survives
the fact that it is - to use an old-fashioned word - sinful: "When a society
abandons its ideals, just because most people can't live up to them, behavior gets
very ugly indeed." Judith Martin, "Miss Manners," The Washington Post, Jan. 1,
1984, p. G-1, col. 1, G-6, col. 6. It is important to underline the claim - my claim -
that the gentleman's ethic is rooted in his culture; I do not claim any other
foundation for it; I do not see the gentleman as appealing to a categorical impera-
tive.
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The gentleman learns how to tell the truth at last - and, more
important for a lawyer, how to get out of his client's way, so that his
client can tell the truth.93 Repentance means all of this and it also
means, for a gentleman-lawyer, that he learns how to show his
community that it too has to repent. "The shame will still be there of
course," Gavin says, "but then the whole chronicle of man's immoral-
ity is in his struggle toward the stars in the stepping-stones of his
expiations."
Intruder in the Dust is also an ironic story about becoming a
gentleman. Gavin has to learn, one stepping-stone at a time, how a
gentleman comes to terms with his complicity; he also, and at the
same time, has to teach his nephew how to be a gentleman, and to
show his nephew how to be relatively less in complicity than Gavin
has been. Gavin has to do this even when his nephew needs a lesson
on complicity less than Gavin himself does. The irony is that Gavin
has to learn from Chick, his student, how it could have been that
Chick believed Lucas when Gavin did not: "When did you really begin
to believe him? ... I want to know, you see. Maybe I'm not too old to
learn either." The answer is that Chick never disbelieved Lucas; he
was not old enough, yet, to be in complicity. That answer deepens and
underlines Gavin's awareness of complicity; it makes repentance
more urgent, because, unless repentance comes quickly and clearly,
Chick will either become a gentleman as much in complicity as Gavin
is, or he will run away from his community, and it is only in his
community that he can find out who he is. The gentleman values his
community that much: It is where he learns who he is.
Gavin sees that he has to learn to tell the truth in the community,
and, even more, to step aside so that his client can tell the truth in the
community. The community doesn't listen; Gavin is unable to teach
his community to tell the truth; it is persistently able to be indiffer-
ent, especially to what it already knows and values. Gavin, the
gentleman, is not able to be indifferent:9 4 He can be ignorant; he can
be self-deceived; but he cannot be irresponsible. He will not be able to
do as much about racism as Chick will be able to do; Gavin finds that
some of the marks of his complicity are indelible. But Gavin is finally
able to deny the social engines that protect cultural deception; and he
does this by affirming his community's values.
This is not at first a matter of prophetic witness; it is at first a
matter of repentance. It is a way of coming to understand how the
community's manner, its customs, its delusions, protect it in its evil,
93 Stephen Wexler, "Practicing Law for Poor People" (1970), 79 Yale Law Journal
1049.
94 I see the same theme in To Kill a Mockingbird; supra note 55.
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and have protected him in his evil. The intellectual maturity that
Gavin shows to Chick is that learning, in repentance, is a matter of
looking at the community from a point of view provided by describing
the values the community believes but hides from. The teaching
method requires that Chick understand where the values come from,
and that means Chick must repent, too, for his early and callow
contempt for his community, for his failure to be compassionate, and
for not understanding how painful the lesson will be for those who are
willing to learn it; but mostly Gavin has to tell Chick that Chick may
be able to do what Gavin has not done and will not do:
95
[T]hey were his own and he wanted no more save to stand with them unalterable
and impregnable: one shame if shame must be, one expiation since expiation must
surely be but above all one unalterable durable impregnable one: one people one
heart one land: so that suddenly he said,
"Look-" and stopped but as always no more was needed.
"Yes?" his uncle said, then when he said no more: "Ah, I see. It's not that they were
right but that you were wrong."
"I was worse," he said. "I was righteous."
"It's all right to be righteous," his uncle said. "Maybe you were right and they were
wrong. Just dont stop."
"Dont stop what?" he said.
"Even bragging and boasting is all right too," his uncle said. "Just dont stop."
"Dont stop what?" he said again. But he knew what now; he said:
"Aint it about time you stopped being a Tenderfoot scout too?"
"This is not Tenderfoot," his uncle said. "This is the third degree. What do you call
it?-"
"Eagle scout," he said. "Tenderfoot is, Dont accept. Eagle scout is, Dont stop. You
see? No, that's wrong. Dont bother to see. Dont even bother not to forget it. Just dont
stop."
The lesson is the one Chick begins with: His ability to act, like his
uncle's ability to understand why he did not act, are the products of
one unalterable durable impregnable community. Chick is learning
not to accept; that's integrity. And not to stop; that's courage. Both
Gavin and Chick are able to learn because they are able to repent -
because complicity remains an issue for them.
The gentleman's ethic copes with institutional power by keeping
alive the issue of complicity. Because of that, the gentlemen-lawyers
in these Southern stories are able to spell out what the culture
believes, and to compare what it believes with what it is doing. Chick
is learning this from Gavin. Gavin, in repentance, is learning from
Chick. It is important to say again that the moral demand - this
tardy learning of what Gavin knew all along - is the moral demand
of the community. It is the community that provides the moral sub-
stance and the community that demands that the offices of repent-
ance be filled by gentlemen and by lawyers. (There is a question here
95 Intruder in the Dust 209-210 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1948).
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of whether the gentleman will be able to countenance the harm that
will result to the community if the gentleman is effective in his office
of repentance. That is a question I take up in the fourth test of the
gentleman's ethic.)
There is another way to put this: The dichotomies of moral life, the
biblical (and Augustinian and Lutheran) distinction between the
world and the kingdom of God, are not ontological; the dichotomies
are in each of us. There is not here, in this corner, the righteous; and
there, in that corner, the practitioners of coercion. The community is
not a limit on the self; it is inside the self. That is why the gentleman
values tradition and constancy and why he has to learn how to repent
for his complicity. And that is why the gentleman's insistence on
integrity is important in professional ethics.96
If you narrow this issue from the community context to the more
intimate context of professional person and client, the test is whether
the professional person looks upon the other, the client, as a threat or
as a gift. As the occasion for learning, as one to wait for, or as a bundle
of movements and words.97 As a subject or as an aggregation of
interests. Whether our professional lives, for clients, are an occasion
for performance or a way to tell the truth. The gentleman-lawyer has
finally understood, I think, and often in repentance, that his client is
a gift: Gavin Stevens comes to that understanding at the end of the
story, when Lucas comes to the law office to forgive Gavin for compli-
city with slavery. Gavin's ethic was able to carry him that far - to the
place of forgiveness - because it would not allow him to hide from his
complicity. "The recognition of complicity," Robert Penn Warren
said, "is the beginning of innocence."98
The question, then, is one of returning this ethic to the institution
- to ask whether Gavin's ethic shows him what to do about his
professional institutions. Can institutions be told the truth? The
answer to that question involves tragedy and suffering.
Test No. 3: Does the Gentleman's Ethic Take Into Account the
Tragic Nature of the Moral Life?
A Bible story: Saul, king of Israel, was ordered by God to make war on
the A malekites and to put them all to death. Saul made war as ordered,
and killed as ordered, with one exception: He spared Agag, king of the
Amalekites. God was displeased; He took the kingdom away from
96 Stanley Hauerwas, "Constancy and Forgiveness: The Novel as a School for Vir-
tue" (1984), Notre Dame English Journal, 23.
97 Supra note 4 at 84: "Bott saw people as bundles of movements and words from
which it was his duty to extract proof of whatever he wanted to believe about
them."
98 Brother to Dragons (1953), at 215.
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Saul.9 9 "Saul was wrong in sparing King Agag .. ."Elie Weisel says.
"The Talmud spells it out: whoever shows mercy for the merciless will
end up by becoming merciless toward men committed to mercy....
Saul was wrong, but we love him for it, and so does our tradition. We
love him because he did not kill, because he dared transgress the
command and let the Amalekite king live. Saul fell victim to his own
humanism and thus became a tragic hero.... King Saul did not put
King Agag to death. He could have - and perhaps he should have -
but he did not."1 ° ° So deep is the Jewish respect for life that Jews love
Saul for defying God Himself in order to spare a life.
Saul's was a tragic choice. The question for the gentleman is
whether his ethic equips him to deal in an admirable way, as King
Saul did, with the tragic nature of the moral life. The stories in which
the gentleman's culture - and therefore the gentleman himself -
finds its values are prototypically stories of tragic choice. The story of
Saul and Agag is an example from religious tradition. The story of
Antigone, or the story, in the Crito, of Socrates's staying to be killed in
Athens, when he could have escaped, are examples from the philo-
sophical tradition. Atticus Finch's complicity in falsehood to protect
Boo Radley, and Chick Mallison's return to share in the moral agony
of Jefferson, Mississippi, are Southern-gentleman stories from which
the gentleman-lawyer learns, when he is young, that gentlemen don't
accept evil, don't stop resisting evil, and don't leave home because of
evil.
These are stories in which theories of what is right and what is
wrong are not dispositive; they show that our morals lie deeper than
theories of right and wrong. The moral direction these stories show is
not arbitrary, though; tragedy is not a casual choice at a fork in the
road or the flipping of a coin. It is a direction we can understand when
we know the whole story: At the end of the story we say that lying to
protect Boo Radley is the sort of thing Atticus would do. We might not
have been able to predict the decision, but when we know it in the
context of his life and of the culture we share with him, we can see
that it fits. One way to analyze that fact a bit would be to notice that
the moral directions taken by Saul, Antigone, Socrates, Atticus, and
Chick Mallison were both personal and cultural. These directions
were consequent on - to use an old-fashioned word - the moral
formation of the actor. It is important, I think, to see that this in-
formation goes on throughout life and that it is a matter primarily of
learning; learning and change are displayed in these stories: in the
youth of Chick and Antigone, in the mature lives of Saul and Atticus,
99 I Samuel 15.
100 A Jew Today (1978), at 175.
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and at the end of the life of Socrates. Our study of the way the
gentleman changes as he learns is the study, not of propositions, but
of history:191 "When self and nature are ... in right relation we
perceive the truth of our existence. But because truth is unattainable
without a corresponding transformation of self, 'ethics,' as the inves-
tigation of that transformation, does not follow after ... prior sys-
tematic presentation ... but is at the beginning of ... reflection."
That is, the truth of our existence and the study of what we should do
are a single inquiry. The process is both personal and cultural:
The gentleman passes through and takes moral direction from
tragedy in the same way he deals with abuses of power - with
integrity, and rooted in his culture. This means, of course, that he is
rarely dead sure that he's right. His not being sure is not a failing, but
is a strength; it comes about because he is virtuous in a world in which
the interesting moral questions are like Saul's and Antigone's. Atti-
cus Finch's protection of Boo Radley is personal in this way, as is Sir
Thomas More's refusal to take the Oath of Succession when the
nobility and hierarchy of England have capitulated to the King. Both
gentlemen honor their culture and, in the direction they take, display
the moral formation they have from their culture. More finally says
that this apparent eccentricity is a consequence of his integrity; his
culture (even the law) taught him to act as he does. He also says that
the integrity of his society depends on individual moral integrity,
that the statesman who betrays conscience leads his country to chaos;
his direction is political and professional as well as personal, but it
was historically, and is in Robert Bolt's understanding, a direction
rooted in More's "adamantine" sense of who he is.102 And that sense is
both personal and cultural.
Stories of gentlemen are personal, as well as cultural, because they
are stories of learning how to be good. 103 This is clear in the Southern-
gentleman stories in which a mature gentleman passes through
(Atticus) and learns from tragedy (Gavin) as he teaches the novice
gentleman both how to behave and how to learn (Chick Mallison and
Scout and Jem Finch), and as he discovers himself how to behave and
how to learn. Learning how to be good is also the center of narratives
where the tragedies and crises are intimate and even minor and the
gentleman is apparently fixed in his habits and attitudes: Plan-
tagenet Palliser is Duke of Omnium and an aging widower when he
passes through the family crises that brought Trollope to say Plana-
101 Supra note 9 (Peaceful Kingdom), at 16. "Ethics," Hauerwas says, "is not primari-
ly about rules and principles, rather it is about how the self must be transformed
to see the world truthfully." Id., at 33.
102 Supra note 37; supra note 66, ch. 18-19.
103 Supra note 101, at xx, xxiii, 15.
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tagenet was the perfect gentleman, and Letwin to choose him as
second only to Madame Max.10 4 One such crisis is his learning to
apologize to Madame Max for a private injustice to her; the other is
learning to change his mind about his daughter's suitor. These are
stories of how good people grow and learn and change; C.P. Snow's
plots almost always turned on such processes. These stories say that
the gentleman's moral life is a life of learning - and very often of
learning how moral life is tragic and what a gentleman does about
tragedy. They refute in the clearest way the trite falsehood that a
22-year-old in a university law school is too old to learn morals. Gavin
and the Duke would say the law student's problem is that he is not old
enough.
The way the gentleman learns is from and with history (his story);
he puts events together and makes sense - a story - out of them.
Gavin Stevens does that with the events of his and his town's life with
Lucas Beauchamp. Plantagenet Palliser does it when he fits his
troubles with Madame Max and with his daughter Mary into his own
and his late wife's youth together. I try to fashion a history "sufficient
to give me a sense of self, one which looks not only to my past but
points to the future, thereby giving my life a telos and a direction....
My act is not something I cause, as though it were external to me, but
is mine because I am able to 'fit' it into my ongoing story."'
10 5
But this history is not only personal; it is also the story of the
gentleman's culture. "No one can become virtuous by doing what
virtuous people do. We can only become virtuous by doing what
virtuous people do in the manner that they do it [in]... by learning
from others how that is done.., by becom[ing] part of a community
that practices virtues .. ." 0 The Jews do not love life because of
Saul; they love Saul because he shows them how much Jews love life.
When the gentleman passes through tragedy, and tragically refuses
to take an indicated moral direction - as Antigone and Saul do - he
honors the direction he refuses to take: Antigone shows no contempt
for Creon, and Saul certainly does not show contempt for God. The
meaning of the stories is that Greeks revere their dead and Jews love
life; but the meaning of the story of the Greeks is that they honor the
gods, and the story of the Jews is the story of a love affair with God.
Those values, in our seminal moral cultures, are not dissipated - in
fact they are enhanced - by the stories of Antigone and of Saul. The
Jew or Christian who is also an English-speaking gentleman and a
104 The Duke's Children (1880).
105 Note 101 supra 36, 42; this notion of the fitting is derived from H. Richard
Niebuhr, supra note 16; I attempted to apply it to legal education in "Brother
Justinian Goes to Law School" (1984), 34 Journal of Legal Education 190.
106 Supra note 101, at 76.
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physician or a lawyer has been formed by such stories; all of us have.
That's how, whether we want to be gentlemen or not, we know what it
is to be gentlemen.'
0 7
We understand the gentleman and we see, when the stories are
over, that what he does in great matters is fitting, because we know
about him in small matters. Atticus and Gavin are heroic in telling
the truth because they are ordinary in telling the truth.' 8 The ethics
of virtue rest on small events, not great ones. We don't talk about the
tragic nature of moral life when the matter is small; we talk then in
trite phrases. We talk, for example, about tolerance for ambiguity,
which really means tolerance for the way people are: People are not
interchangeable; tolerance means waiting for the other, and the
other is always different. We lawyers mean people when we say that
no two cases are alike. The gentleman's tolerance is a skill for notic-
ing the differences. His integrity carries him intact through the chaos
of that. It seems to me not accidental that the ordinary ethos of
lawyers in America has a special affinity for gentlemen and an
affinity as well for ambiguity. These two affinities, writ large, lead us
to the tragic character of professional moral life.'0 9
Test No. 4: Does the Gentleman's Ethic Give Adequate
Consideration to the Moral Significance of Suffering?
The gentleman learns from his religious tradition the differences
between suffering and pain. Suffering is pain understood; suffering is
pain that has meaning. Stories about gentlemen are filled with the
hero's suffering as the price of virtue, from wounds in battle, to being
spat upon (as Atticus was), to endurance of the privations of hunger
and cold as an expression of love, to suffering fools gladly. Much of
this is conventional valor or unselfishness or good manners. It comes
about because it is expected; the gentleman treats it as a matter of
duty, or kindness, or understanding.
Suffering to overcome evil goes beyond suffering as pain under-
stood. In our culture, suffering to overcome evil expresses the reli-
gious tradition. Jews understand the suffering of Israel, for example,
as pain endured so that God's kingdom may prevail for the sake of all
107 It is the knowing that is significant ethically; in stories, the question is whether
the person thinks it is important to be a gentleman. These are more significant
questions than whether he is a gentleman or not. Trollope's Phineas Finn may or
may not have been a gentleman - opinions vary - but it is clear that his was the
gentleman's ethic.
108 Supra note 55.
109 Dean Monroe Freedman's widely read Lawyers Ethics in an Adversary System
(1975) is more keenly attuned to this tragic character than it is usually given
credit for being.
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mankind; that is the traditional Jewish understanding of the songs of
the suffering servant in the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, and of the
image of the Servant of the Lord in the Book of Daniel: 0
a thing despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and familiar with suffering, a
man to make people screen their faces ... like a lamb that is led to the slaughter-
house ... he offers his life in atonement... and through him what Yahweh wishes
will be done.
Christians appropriated Hebraic images of the suffering servant as
descriptive of the man Jesus, the Lamb of God, whose way of dealing
with evil was to tell the truth about it and to suffer violence rather
than to be violent. Jesus taught that the Servant of the Lord was
subordinate, that he was not the one who was served at table but the
one who did the serving: "For who is greater: the one at table or the
one who serves? The one at table, surely? Yet here am I among you as
one who serves.""'
If the moral significance of my fourth test is either of these under-
standings of what suffering is - either the conventional price of the
virtuous life or the means of overcoming evil - the gentleman's ethic
takes suffering into account and makes sense of it; it passes the fourth
test. Dr. Craig teaches his young colleagues that long hours, exposure
to disease, and the violence of inner-city Boston are the ways physi-
cians serve their patients. Andrew Hamilton came out of comfortable
retirement to the risk of defending Zenger's defiance of colonial
government;" 2 John Adams endured Boston's disapproval in order to
provide legal counsel to the British soldiers who fired on the crowd in
the Boston Massacre;" 3 Atticus and Miss Habersham went alone to
stand between their black friends and the lynch mobs; Judge James
Edwin Horton risked his judicial career - and lost, as he knew he
would - when he granted a motion for a new trial in the second of the
Scottsboro Cases." 4 Our gentleman-heroes teach us that good doctors
and good lawyers suffer for justice, and repent for injustice.
115
110 Isaiah 53:3, 9-10, Jerusalem Bible.
111 Luke 22:27, Jerusalem Bible, discussed, as legal ethics, in my essay cited supra
note 30.
112 A. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britian 1764-
1776 (1966), at 64-65; B. Bailyn and J. Hench (eds.), The Press and the American
Revolution (1980), at 74, 369; Hamilton's jury speech is in Theodore Schroeder
(ed.), Free Press Anthology (1909), at 104.
113 Catharine Drinker Bowen, John Adams and the American Revolution (1950), at
386-409.
114 Supra note 13, ch. 14.
115 Supra note 4, at 235-239: Letwin uses the ecclesiastical novels to discuss religion
and the gentleman, including the Anglican priests Arabin and Crawley as exam-
ples on this point.
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Where the gentleman's ethic fails is when sound morals require
others to suffer. This is not a failure of the gentleman's Hebraic
religious heritage but a failure in the gentleman's ethic, a failure to
be faithful to the religious heritage. It is, more specifically, a failure
to comprehend the mystery and the hope that the heritage provides as
the means for being truthful about evil in the world, about what
Newman called the passion and the pride of man:
116
the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the
curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the
success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin,
the pervading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion, that condi-
tion of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle's words,
'having no hope and without God in the world' - all this is a vision to dizzy and
appall; and inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is
absolutely beyond human solution.
Philip Mason echoes Newman's view (and C.S. Lewis's) that the
gentleman's ethic is not finally Christian but only, in Mason's phrase,
"a cult derived from Christianity."'117 It is in the same way not Jewish
either, but in the same way is a cult derived from Judaism. I think the
difference between being a gentleman and being a Jew or a Christian
is that the gentleman is optimistic and responsible where the radical
believer is hopeful. Hope is optimism with truth; the religious tradi-
tion teaches that it is important to see and to say that the world is the
sort of place Newman describes and that most of the circumstances
and results Newman describes are beyond the control even of gentle-
men. They are mysteries. They wait behind a curtain hung over the
gentleman's futurity.
1 18
Truthful response requires hope, not so much when truthful re-
sponse brings harm to the gentleman but when it brings harm to
other people; the harm that may come to others is not a moral
argument against truthful response. Here is where the gentleman's
sense .of responsibility for what happens, his confidence in his abili-
ties, and an optimism born of the view that a person chooses what
happens to him, lead the gentleman astray. He wants too much for
things to come out right.
What rends the gentleman-lawyer's professional ethic is that
gentlemen-lawyers think they can save their clients from suffering.
116 Quoted supra note 42, at 182-183.
117 Id., at 152.
118 Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus 153-160 (2d rev. ed. 1972), shows how
the parables of the judge (Luke 18:2-8) and of the friend (Luke 11:5-8) are intended
by Jesus "to imbue the disciples with the certainty that God will deliver them
from the coming tribulation ... nothing is more certain than his mercy to his
own." Id., at 160. Supra note 66, ch. 18-19, is Stanley Hauerwas's and my
discussion of hope in the life of Thomas More.
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The gentleman-lawyer thinks so well of his ability to control his own
destiny and to protect those he defines as dependent on him, that he
betrays the substance and the purpose of his virtues. Trollope's
lawyers show this: Consider Thomas Furnival, defense counsel in R.
v. Mason, in Orley Farm, and compare him with Mrs. Orme in that
story or with the Rev. Septimus Harding of The Warden. Furnival did
a lawyer's job in defending Lady Mason, who was guilty of perjury,
and whom Furnival knew to be guilty. But he could not - would not
- help her to peace in her guilt or to reconciliation with her family
and her community. He could not do that because he could not bear
the price she would have to pay if she told the truth. And so he
pretended that he thought her innocent, and defended her with
cleverness and success, and did her no good at all. He abused truthful
witnesses, scandalized a young colleague, and contributed to cyni-
cism in his profession. Lady Mason's comforter was not her lawyer,
but her neighbor Mrs. Orme, whose skills were the skills of a truthful
friend. Mrs. Orme was not clever; her advice to Lady Mason was to
tell the truth. Lady Mason finally did tell the truth, after her lawyers
left the scene, and of course she suffered. 119
It is a fair reading of the story that Lady Mason wanted to tell the
truth all along but that she needed a counselor or an advocate or a
friend to help her do it. She needed a brother or sister who would wait
for her; but her lawyers treated her less as a person to be waited for
than as a set of interests. By their lights they protected her; she was
after all acquitted of perjury. But in fact they deceived themselves
into doing for her only what their profession had licensed them to do.
They pretended that this was what she wanted done. Furnival finally
supposed his function was the most important thing he could do, the
most important thing to be done in the case - not because he was
duped by Brougham's ethic but because he thought he could save his
client from suffering.
Furnival's difficulty as a gentleman did not have to do with a tragic
choice; tragic choices presuppose clear sight. Furnival fooled himself
into thinking he could make things come out right in the sort of world
Newman described, and therefore Furnival never reached the clarity
that makes the understanding of tragedy coherent and useful:
Mr. Furnival did think that he might induce a jury to acquit her; but he terribly
feared that he might not be able to induce the world to acquit her also. ...
He... seemed to feel that it would suffice for him if he could so bring it about that
her other friends should think her innocent .... It would be sweet to feel that she
119 I have written more elaborate essays on both examples: Supra note 66, ch. 5-7
(Orley Farm); "A Lesson From Trollope for Counsellors at Law" (1978), 35
Washington and Lee Law Review 727, reprinted as ch. 1 in Robert S. Redmount's
and my Legal Interviewing and Counseling (1980) (The Warden).
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was in his hands, and that he would treat her with mercy and kindness... he must
be able to proclaim aloud his belief in her innocence.
And the only way to do that was to be untruthful with himself and
everyone else and to claim as excuse the determination to protect
Lady Mason from harm.
It may be that the reason Thomas Furnival "feared that he might
not be able to induce the world to acquit her also" was that he
distrusted the world; he had described for himself the community in
which he and Lady Mason lived. He described a community that had
no way to forgive Lady Mason, no way to take her back, as he had
forgiven her and taken her back. Whether his description of the
community was accurate or not, Furnival was certainly right to see
the risk involved. But his refusal to take the risk amounts to a
judgment on his community (and Trollope's calling it "the world," in
an almost scriptural way, signals the judgment): It was not the sort of
community that was capable of caring for those who suffer when a
gentleman tells the truth. Or, to put that another way, it was not a
community in which the gentleman was able to be both among the
truthful and among the providers of comfort to those who suffer when
the truth is told. 120
This perspective might also explain why Gavin Stevens was un-
able to do what Martin Luther King, Jr., did - to bring the racist
community to repentance. The community William Faulkner de-
scribed was not a community able to comfort those who suffer when
the truth is told about the continuation of slavery; but the community
King described was a community that was able to hear the black
church; the black church was a prophetic force; it was not racist, and
never had been; it was and always had been Southern. It could bring
its community to repentance.'
21
Septimus Harding, of The Warden, was the manager of an en-
dowed rest home for poor, old men. The rest home got too much
money, and Harding was paid too much of what it got; the residents of
the rest home got very little. Septimus was not as deeply deceived in
his profession as the lawyers in Orley Farm were in theirs, nor as
deceived as other gentleman-clergymen who held endowed livings in
his diocese. It took time and a bit of prodding but Septimus came to
see that he was overpaid and to see that he should say so and do what
he could to get the income applied not to the clergy but to the poor.
The price of his telling the truth was poverty for himself and his
daughter and disloyalty to his professional colleagues in the English
120 I am indebted to Stanley Hauerwas for this insight.
121 I hoped to make a somewhat similar argument with regard to women in the legal
profession, text accompanying supra notes 69-80.
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clergy - endowments being, just then, a matter of popular and
parliamentary attention. Harding's lawyer, who saw interests where
he should have seen a person, an unusual person, as every person is,
thought Septimus was addled. Septimus was referred by counsel to
the ministry of his relatives.
* * *
The gentleman-lawyer comes thus to think of himself as a special-
ist in the prevention of pain. The notion that he is a protector from
pain comes from the delusion that he is able to control events, even
such ultimate events as the discovery of his own identity and the
identities of those he serves. Thus the medical profession, until very
recently, pretended it could cure when it could only predict. 122 Thus
Gavin Stevens, who centered his professionalism in the benevolent
racism of patronage, thought he could use his power in the white
community to save his black client's life; but he did not listen to his
client's attempt to tell the truth. Thus Atticus Finch lied to protect
Boo Radley from facing the community and left him to hide and to be
hidden from it. 123 Thus Dr. Thorne protected Mary Thorne from
meeting the drunken Sir Roger Scratcherd, and from learning the
paintful fact that Sir Roger was her uncle. Thus Thomas Furnival
saved Lady Mason from the pain and the promise of telling her
neighbors the truth. The description of the gentleman's protection of
his client is, as nearly as I can tell, universal in stories of gentlemen
who are professionals; literature in English is evidence that protec-
tion of the weak who are not weak124 is fundamental to descriptions of
the gentleman's ethic. Newman's observation that the gentleman
cannot bear to inflict pain becomes the observation that the gentle-
man cannot bear for pain to occur, cannot bear the possibility that he
is unable to prevent pain. And so he hides from what he cannot bear,
in the delusion that he can protect those who depend on him to save
them from suffering. To save them both from pain and from meaning.
Such a delusion is at variance with reality; it is a matter, in
Newman's metaphors, of quarrying granite with razors and mooring
vessels with silken threads. It is deeply corrupting because it takes
away the telos on which the ethics of virtue rest - peace and the
contemplation of truth - and replaces the telos with notions of honor
and shame. The end of a virtuous life is to become a good person; the
end of virtue in professional life is that one's client become a good
122 Supra note 33, at 28.
123 R.A. Dave, "To Kill a Mockingbird: Harper Lee's Tragic Vision," in M.K. Naik,
S.K. Desai, and S. Mokashi-Punekar, Indian Studies in American Fiction (1974);
supra note 55.
124 The phrase is Gavin Stevens's: William Faulkner, The Town 88-96 (Vintage ed.
1961).
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person. Judgments that turn on honor and shame replace that telos
with the approval and disapproval of a narrow, privileged commun-
ity, a community of wealth, status, breeding, and shared profes-
sionalism - the sort of community Furnival described for himself
and for Lady Mason. Such a group nourishes the delusion that pain
can be prevented through control and protection of those who are
dependent on members of the elite group. 125 Letwin's celebration of
the Victorian gentleman does not take seriously enough this flaw in
the gentleman's integrity. I suspect this is because she does not relate
the gentleman's view of his religion to his failure to explicate his
esteem for honor and his horror of shame. 126 She does not see as
clearly as she should that it was impossible for him to be a gentleman
and at the same time come to terms with the fact that the moral life
may bring harm to other people. It is not that the gentleman's reli-
gious tradition failed him, as Letwin and Mason imply, but that he
failed it. The religious tradition that supported and may have created
the gentleman's culture in England was conscious of pain in the world
Newman described. It gave meaning to pain through images such as
the suffering servant of Israel and Jesus on the cross - lives that are
borne by the servants who save, but also lives that are to be expected
of everyone who is part of the tradition. (One remembers Mrs. Meir's
saying, "Every Israeli is a soldier.") In this way Israel explains its
centuries of pain. That is, in this way Israel's pain comes to be
understood in the tradition as a matter not of pain but of suffering. In
this way the church accounts for the fact that its savior lord died as a
matter of law and as an object of capital punishment, and for the fact
that his followers died the same way. "No one is... to be pitied if he
cannot at first belong to this minority," Karl Barth said, "nor to be
envied if he really must.'
127
125 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South
(1982), shows how a morality of honor is one that depends on the approval of
others, that in such a morality "character divorced from social convention" is
incomplete (15). Honor then takes the place of conscience, of personal identity,
and of merit (22, 34). In the old American South, honor made it difficult for a
gentleman to discover and tell the truth because sociability and manliness were
more important to his culture than honesty was (98). The telos is lost in such a
moral culture - as Aristotle said it would be - because the approval of others
takes the place of the quest, or way, that constitutes the virtuous life. See Gilbert
Meilaender, "Joseph Pieper: Explorations in the Thought of a Philosopher of
Virtue" (1983), 11 Journal ofReligious Ethics 114; supra note 30 (ChurchDogma-
tics), at 647-685. The result, in history and in morals, is "a sense of superiority so
dense as to be impenetrable," Michael Howard, Book Review, Washington Post
Book World, Feb. 26, 1984, pp. 1, 4.
126 Mason does; supra note 42.
127 Cited and discussed in Shaffer, supra note 30.
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The English gentleman, who had this tradition at hand, was able
at his best to accept the cross for himself, but he was not able to accept
it for those he thought he was commissioned to protect. He became
instead a muscular Christian. He fashioned for himself a religious
sub-culture that looked like Christianity but was not, 2 ' because he
took away from Christianity (and from Judaism) its shocking and
radical view of suffering: "Remove from Christianity its ability to
shock ... and it is altogether destroyed," Kierkegaard said. "It then
becomes a tiny, superficial thing, capable neither of inflicting deep
wounds nor of healing them.'
129
CONCLUSION
The gentleman's ethic is remarkably hearty. It turns up in a televi-
sion program about doctors in inner-city Boston. It is in our cowboy
stories, our sailor stories, our soldier stories, our lawyer stories, and
even our feminist stories. 130 It looks down on us from the portraits on
the walls of our schools, our hospitals, and our courthouses. We love
the gentleman and we seek to imitate him. We confront the fact that
he is a man, and that his ethic is sexist, by saying that ladies can be
gentlemen too. We probe the substance of his ethic and find Aristotle
- not a bad mentor. We test his ethic and find that it is not essentially
a matter of class or status or wealth or breeding or noblesse oblige. His
ethic withstands tragedy and the pain that personal courage neces-
sarily demands. But, finally, the gentleman cannot account for the
pain that is beyond the reach of personal integrity: Suffering is an
acceptable price when it is paid for physical courage and for confront-
ing evil, but it is too great a price when the gentleman must endure or
even require it of those he proposes to protect.
Maybe it's unfortunate that we cannot invent an ethic, or fashion it
from an inventory of useful ideas. We can at best locate an ethic;
describe it, as we describe ourselves. Approaching the matter in that
128 John Galsworthy's novel, Flowering Wilderness (1932), shows this. Sir Lawrence
Mott says there, "Most of our caste in this country, if they only knew it, are
Confucian rather than Christian. Belief in ancestors, and tradition, respect for
parents, honesty, moderation of conduct, kind treatment of animals and depen-
dents, absence of self-obtrusion, and stoicism in face of pain and death" (46,
Scribners ed. 1970). The offence of Winifred Desert, who is hounded from England
in disgrace because he became a convert to Islam at gunpoint, is not betrayal of
faith, or even of culture, but, as Sir Lawrence puts it, of loyalty: "The individual
Englishman in the East is looked up to as a man who isn't to be rattled, who keeps
his word, and sticks by his own breed" (id., at 82).
129 Cited and discussed in Shaffer, supra note 30.
130 I have in mind The Virginian, Billy Budd, and the novels of Jane Austen.
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cultural way (as the gentleman's ethic itself says we must), I think we
could say that the gentleman's ethic went wrong when it veered away
from its religious tradition, and especially from the means the reli-
gious tradition uses to account for the suffering of others, from the
invitation that follows St. Peter's confession: Take up your cross and
follow. And so, Mason says, the gentleman found specific religion
uncomfortable: 13 1 "Men did not care to look on the torn humiliated
body that bore witness to human cruelty and divine compassion.
Flesh was slightly obscene: and if the Word had been made flesh, the
less said about it the better .... It was better not to think too much
about the Sermon on the Mount and the dangerous doctrines of the
Magnificat.... [W]hat was needed for everyday life was something
less demanding ......
Once that happened - and it happened in the English and Amer-
ican gentleman's way of coming to terms with religion long before
Newman's Oxford Movement - the English Christian community
that had produced saints and martyrs was remembered untruthfully.
In this false memory it became an elite community that preserved
itself in the false virtue of honor; it sought to avoid the false vice of
shame; and it dissipated the teleological nature of the real virtues. It
began by protecting the weak who were not weak and it ended with
apologies for racism and economic injustice, for exploiting the serfs
and marrying money.
You cannot choose a professional ethic as you would choose a
husband or a place to live or a church to go to. A professional ethic is
mostly something you already have. You don't choose it; you describe
it. You try to tell the truth about it. We North American professionals
cannot excise Robert E. Lee or Lewis Thomas's father from our lives;
they are what we have been and what we are. We can be false to them,
as we are often, in our professionalism, false to ourselves; we can
pretend to forget them; but they will not go away.
If we tell the truth about the gentleman's ethic, we will, I think,
admire its strength and its integrity and we will appreciate it as a
source of moral capital that we already have and already want to
have; we will admit our affection for the gentleman.' 32 This is partly
because the gentleman has strength and integrity, and partly be-
cause so much of the professional soul-searching one reads these days
is not professional, not soulful, not searching. The gentleman shines
in comparison. But, then, being as truthful and as thorough as we
can, we might have to say that the gentleman got stopped somewhere
131 Supra note 42, at 148.
132 Supra note 3.
42 Queen's Law Journal
on the road to Jerusalem. It will then be useful - as the proper
business of professional ethics - to see if we can figure out why.'
33
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